We present a model of competition between two advertising-financed media firms when consumers dislike advertising. We apply the model to analyze competition between Internet portals and find that equilibrium prices of advertising are higher the less differentiated the portals are perceived to be. Moreover, we find that the portals' aggregate profit increases if they integrate vertically with advertisers. This is true even if there is perfect competition between advertisers for advertising space. But if the portals are close substitutes, then it is profitable for one of the portals not to combine with an advertiser, and we end up with an asymmetric equilibrium with only one vertical merger -despite aggregate profits being higher with two.
Introduction
Despite the burst of the dot-com bubble, online advertising is back on the rise. According to the Interactive Advertising Bureau and PriceWaterhouseCoopers, estimated revenues from internet advertising in the first quarter of 2004 were the highest since they began tracking revenues in 1996, totalling 2.3 billion USD. Also for Europe, prospects of online advertising seem promising. A report from Jupiter Research forecasts it at 4 billion euros a year (about 4.8 billion USD), amounting to 4.5% of total advertising, with web media accounting for 3 4 of this spending. A report from emarketer.com predicts positive growth rates for online advertising for the coming years. 1 An Internet portal is an entry point for accessing Internet content and services, such as news, weather, email, and chatting.
2 Although portals are financed by advertising revenues, their audiences often dislike the presence of this advertising. In 2002, for example, the portals EarthLink and AOL decided to abolish pop-up ads, arguing that the ads were a nuisance to users.
3 But at the same time as consumers dislike online advertising, they are responsive to it, as Sinrod (2004) reports; thus, there is scope for such advertising to pay off for advertisers.
In this paper, we present a model of competition among media firms which is particularly suitable for analysing competition among Internet portals. We consider a situation where two media firms offer their differentiated products to media consumers, and where a large number of producers operate in independent product markets and buy advertising space from the media firms. We find that a reduction in differentiation between the media firms' products would lead to higher prices on advertising and correspondingly lower quantities of advertising. However, even though the prices of advertising increase as their products become more similar, the media firms' profits decrease. The reason for this is that the media firms compete for audience by choosing a relatively small quantity of advertising. The competition is more intense the closer substitutes the media firms' products are. Hence, the media firms end up with too high prices on advertising and too few commercials, compared to a situation where the media firms maximize industry profit. Indeed, when there is no differentiation between the media firms, we end up with a "Bertrand paradox" with no advertising at all in equilibrium. Our model, therefore, goes a long way in explaining the difficulties experienced by many Internet startups as a result of competition between sites with too similar content and advertising-averse users.
We apply our model to analyze the incentives for vertical integration between media firms and advertisers in such circumstances. Contrary to what we may expect from conventional goods markets, we show that, even when there is perfect competition between the downstream firms (advertisers) for the upstream good (advertising space), aggregate profit of the portals is maximized when each portal merges with an advertiser. This is true even though we abstract from competition between advertisers in end-user markets. 4 To grasp the intuition for this result, suppose the portals are perceived to be perfect substitutes by the consumers. There will then be no advertising in equilibrium if the advertisers and the portals are vertically separated. However, if one of the portals integrates with an advertiser, the integrated entity will choose to advertise both on the competing portal and on its own portal. Thereby, the Bertrand paradox is avoided, and the firms will make a positive profit.
Industry profit being maximized when each portal integrates vertically does not necessarily mean that this is the market structure we will observe in equilibrium. Instead, we may observe an asymmetric equilibrium with only one vertically integrated firm. To see why, suppose only one of the portals has integrated. Because advertising is a nuisance for consumers, it is in the interest of each portal that the competitor takes on a large quantity of advertising. In particular, a vertically integrated firm is able to advertise more on its own portal if it can increase the advertising volume on the rival portal. This means that a vertically integrated firm has a stronger incentive than independent advertisers to place ads on the independent portal. The independent portal can exploit this by increasing its advertising price once the rival has integrated. If the portals are sufficiently close substitutes, so that they compete fiercely for consumers, this effect is so strong that the independent portal prefers not to integrate vertically with an advertiser.
The media industries play an important role in society, not least in terms of the time people spend watching TV or surfing on the Internet. However, there are relatively few studies in the literature analyzing the two-fold role of the media industry -as a provider of entertainment or information and as a transmitter of advertising.
5 Noteable exceptions are Anderson and Coate (2000) , Gabszewicz, et 4 If the advertisers compete against each other in the end-user market, a portal may be able to reduce the competitive pressure faced by an advertiser by integrating with it. Clearly, this gives advertisers and portals additional incentives for vertical integration.
5 On the other hand, there is a large strand of literature that analyzes how rivalry between TV channels affects program diversity. An early analysis of this question is by Steiner (1952) ; see Owen and Wildman (1992) for elaborations on Steiner's model. In Nilssen and Sørgard (1998) , program diversity is modelled along two dimensions.
al. (2000) , and Nilssen and Sørgard (2001) . In these studies, the consumers visit at most one media firm (so-called single-homing). In contrast to these studies, our modelling approach allows for discussion of the effects of product differentiation on the advertising rivalry between media firms in a setting with multi-homing. We also add to the literature by analyzing the incentives for vertical integration in media industries.
In the next Section, we present a duopoly model of media competition, a crucial feature of which is the specification of consumer benefits and costs of using a medium. We phrase the model in terms of Internet portals, but the model in itself is also applicable to other media. In Section 3, we present the equilibrium outcomes. In Section 4, we apply the model to analyze the incentives for vertical integration between portals and advertisers. In Section 5, we provide some concluding remarks.
The model
Consider a media industry where we have two advertising outlets, 1 and 2. To fix ideas and facilitate the subsequent discussion, we refer to the two outlets as portals. By visiting the portals, a representative consumer obtains a (gross) utility level equal to
where V j is the number of visits to portal j = 1, 2, and b ∈ [0, 1) is a measure of product differentiation: The higher is b, the closer substitutes are the two portals. We normalize the number of consumers to 1. The portals earn revenue by selling advertising banners to firms that intend to spur sales of their products. We call these firms producers or advertisers. Consumers visit the portals free of charge. However, they have a disutility of being interrupted by commercials. To capture this, we assume that the subjective cost of visiting portal j = 1, 2 is C j = A j V j , where A j is the total level of advertising on that portal. Optimal consumer behavior is characterized by ∂U/∂V j = A j , which implies that
From (2), we find that the total number of visitors is equal to V 1 + V 2 = 2 − A 1 − A 2 ; thus, it is independent of b for any given levels of advertising. We further see that
This means that if A 1 > A 2 , say, then portal 2 captures a larger number of visitors at the expense of portal 1, the higher is b. This is because an increase in b makes the portals less differentiated, so that the consumers become more prone to shift from one portal to the other. We envisage a two-stage game wherein the portals choose how much advertising space to make available for the producers at stage 1 (quantity setting), while the producers choose how many advertising banners to purchase from each of the two portals at stage 2. 
The portals' profit functions
Let R 1 and R 2 denote the prices the portals charge from the producers for each advertising banner, and assume that the cost for the portals of inserting a banner equals zero. The profit functions of the portals may then be written as
The advertisers' profit functions
We have n symmetric producers, indexed i ∈ {1, .., n} , who operate in independent markets and generate sales by advertising on the portals. More specifically, by inserting A ji banners on portal j, producer i will sell A ji units of its goods to each visitor on that portal. 7 Assuming that the revenue per banner equals 1, the profit level of producer i can then be written as
6 Alternatively, we could have assumed that the portals set prices of advertising rather than quantities. This would not affect our main results. 7 One interpretation is that we assume an inelastic consumer demand for the goods sold by the producers, and that all consumers have the same willingness to pay for each unit of the goods. The producers will then charge the consumers a price equal to their reservation price. Since the consumers pay their reservation price for the goods from the producers, we do not need to include these goods in the consumers' utility function. This formulation is analogous to the one used in Anderson and Coate (2000) . Note that consumers are identical in terms of their demand for the advertisers' products, and there is therefore no scope for consumer characteristics to enter into the advertisers' decisions. Our formulation also disregards any congestion effects of advertising, except what is caused by consumers' disutility of advertising; thus, an advertiser's demand for advertising on a portal is in no way directly affected by an increase in others' advertising on that portal.
Industry optimum
Suppose the whole industry (portals and producers) is owned by one single firm. Since banner prices are irrelevant in this case, the maximization problem is simply
where
Because the total market size is independent of b, the level of advertising will also be independent of b. Performing the maximization problem in (5), it is straightforward to show that total advertising on the two portals equals
where the asterisk denotes industry optimum. Aggregate industry profit equals
, and the number of visitors to each portal is
.
Equilibrium analysis
We now move to our main case of two independent portals and n independent advertisers. We are looking for a subgame-perfect equilibrium of our two-stage game and therefore proceed by examining stage 2 first.
Stage 2:
The maximization problem of advertiser i is
so that its first-order conditions are given by
Setting ∂π i /∂A 1i = 0, we find
where A 1,−i and A 2,−i are the number of advertising banners inserted by the other advertisers on portal 1 and 2, respectively. Equation (8) shows that the advertising level A 1i for advertiser i on portal 1 is decreasing in A 1,−i and increasing in the number of banners on the other portal. This latter property stems from portal 1 being more attractive for the consumers, other things equal, the more they are interrupted by banners on portal 2. Finally, we see that A 1i is decreasing in the advertising cost R 1 . We have a similar expression for demand for advertising on portal 2.
Since the advertisers are symmetric, they will all have the same advertising level in equilibrium. This means that A ji = A j /n. Inserting this into (8) and rewriting, we have:
so that the level of advertising on each portal depends negatively on the advertising cost on that portal (∂A 1 /∂R 1 = ∂A 2 /∂R 2 < 0). 8 This means that the portal with the lower banner price will have the larger number of banners. Note, however, that the number of banners on each portal is decreasing also in the cost of advertising on the other portal if b > 0;
< 0. In other words, advertising on portal 1 and advertising on portal 2 are complementary goods. To see why, suppose that R 1 increases. The direct effect of this is that the advertisers reduce their advertising on portal 1, which consequently becomes more attractive for the consumers. This, in turn, means that portal 2 becomes relatively less attractive and will therefore be visited by fewer consumers. Thus, the advertisers will respond by reducing their advertising on portal 2 as well, and more so the more equal the portals are perceived to be by the consumers. The negative effect of setting a relatively high banner price is therefore smaller, the higher is the value of b.
One interesting implication of equation (9) is that the portal with the higher advertising price will sell more banners the less differentiated the portals are perceived to be. Thus, if R 1 > R 2 , say, then the relatively high consumer attractiveness of portal 1 means that A 1 is increasing in b (while A 2 is decreasing in b). This can be seen formally by differentiating equation (9) with respect to b:
We can summarize our analysis of stage 2 as follows:
Lemma 1. Fo r a given pair of banner prices R 1 and R 2 , a) if the price per banner is the same on the two portals, then the number of banners is independent of b, i.e., if 
Stage 1:
At the first stage, portal j maximizes Π j = R j A j with respect to A j . Solving this, we find that the equilibrium level of advertising on each portal is:
The reason why the number of banners is decreasing in b is that the consumers perceive the portals to be closer substitutes the higher is b. Thereby, the portals will have to compete more fiercely for visitors, and thus reduce the level of utilitydecreasing advertising.
From the equilibrium levels of advertising, we can easily compute the equilibrium price:
This shows that the closer substitutes the portals are, the higher is the price per banner in equilibrium. This is because the portals compete for visitors by reducing the level of advertising, which induces them to charge higher banner prices. Note also that the number of advertisers (n) does not affect the equilibrium price. It is the rivalry between the portals that is decisive for banner prices. Since the number of banners is decreasing in b, the number of visits by consumers to the portals is increasing in b. However, the higher banner prices imply that the advertisers earn lower profits the less differentiated the portals are:
The fact that a higher b leads to higher equilibrium prices for banners does not mean that the profits of the portals are increasing in b. On the contrary, the portals are forced to set higher advertising prices and lower advertising levels the stronger the competition between the portals. Thus, each portal's profit is decreasing in b:
To sum up, we have the following: Proposition 1. The less differentiated the portals are perceived to be, the higher are advertising prices and the lower are advertising levels and profits.
From (11) and (14), we obtain:
We see that if the portals are (almost) perfect substitutes, then there will be (almost) no advertising in equilibrium. This is an outcome which parallels the wellknown Bertrand paradox, since it implies that the portals compete away (almost) all profits. Interestingly, though, this is true even though the portals are quantity setters rather than price setters. The reason for this is that advertising is perceived to be a bad by the consumers. In the limit as b approaches 1, each portal therefore has an incentive to set a lower advertising level than the other in order to attract visitors, thereby forcing the number of banners down to zero.
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Inserting for (11) into (2), we further find that (for j = 1, 2)
We can thus state Lemma 2. The size of the audience is larger the less differentiated the portals are perceived to be.
The intuition for Lemma 2 is that the larger is b, the stronger is the competition between the portals. Stronger competition between the portals forces them to reduce the level of advertising, which is beneficial for the consumers, who dislike advertising. This relationship is illustrated in Figure 1 .
10 It should be noted that our result resembles what we find in more conventional markets, where competition typically increases output and reduces prices. In our context, the "price" the consumers have to pay is the level of advertising A j , and output corresponds to the size of the audience. A monopoly portal (b = 0) utilizes its market power by charging a relatively high price (A j = 1 2 ), while perfect competition (b = 1) drives profit and the advertising level down to zero. More generally, the smaller the market power of each portal, the lower the implicit consumer price A j and the larger the audience V j . 
Ve r t i c a l Integration on the Internet
In the previous Section, the advertisers and the media firms were by assumption independent firms. It is not obvious that this is a good description of the Internet industry. Certainly, we find many Internet portals that are organizationally independent of their advertisers. However, there are also numerous examples of Internet portals that form alliances or merge with or buy advertisers (such as Ya h o o 's purchase of Geocities). For instance, in 1998, the web portal Excite.com signed an exclusive advertising agreement with NetGrocer, Inc., under which the latter would be the only supermarket featured in the portal. In a similar spirit, iVillage.com, a women's portal, established eight commercial partners to be advertised throughout the portal. Furthermore, in year 2000, the telecommunications company Ve r i z o n Communications invested $3 million in an exclusive sponsorship of the "Lifestyle" channel at BET.com, a web portal aimed at African Americans. Another example is parenting sites on the Internet. These portals offer information on pregnancy and child-upbringing, and Ya h o o ! has made an exclusive advertising agreement with Kimberly-Clark's parenting portal. 12 Other parenting sites on the Internet have chosen to stay independent and offer banners and advertisements for a large variety of producers.
13 This illustrates that we observe a mixture of vertical relationships in the portals industry: At one extreme, some portals merge with advertisers, and at the other extreme, portals stay independent of their advertisers. 14 1. In that case, we will observe advertising also in the limit as b → 1, because this resembles Cournot competition in an 'ordinary' market. However, it is still true that ∂A j /∂b < 0; see Barros, et al. (2002) . 10 Figure 1 considers the limit values of V j and A j from equations (2) and (11) as n → ∞. 11 In this paper, we use a quadratic utility function (see equation (1)) where the size of the market is independent of b for any given advertising level A 1 = A 2 . Thus, b is a one-dimensional measure of product differentiation. Alternatively, we could have used the standard utility function
2 + bV 1 V 2 . The disadvantage of this formulation is that the size of the market would be decreasing in b. Thereby, b would be a measure both of the size of the market and the extent of product differentiation, which would make it more difficult to interpret the equations. It should be noted, though, that the qualitative results of the paper are independent of which of these two quadratic utility functions we use.
12 See the portal http://health.yahoo.com/parenting/. For details concerning the agreement between Ya h o o ! and Kimberly-Clark, see http://www.clickz.com/news /article.php/1059251 . 13 One example is http://www.babyzone.com , who carries the banners of numerous different producers.
14 We also observe that producers who have exclusivity agreements with one portal, buy banners also on competing portals. Kimberly-Clark is an example of this. As noted above, the company has made an exclusive agreement with the parenting portal at Ya h o o ! At the same time, the competing portal http://www.babyzone.com has banners for various Kimberly-Clark brands, for example Huggies products, as well as for other producers' products.
A merger between an advertiser and a portal can be used as a tool to foreclose other producers from an advertising outlet, and thereby reduce product market competition between advertisers. This merging incentive is not present in our paper since we have presupposed that the advertisers operate in independent markets. A portal may also have incentives to merge with an advertiser if the advertisers have some market power over the portals. But contrary to what we may expect from conventional goods markets, we show that a portal may gain from vertical integration even if there is perfect competition between the downstream firms (advertisers) for the upstream good (advertising space). To this end, we extend our model by introducing a stage 0 in which each of the portals decides whether to merge with an advertiser. This gives rise to essentially three different subgames following stage 0: one in which no vertical integration takes place, which is the situation analyzed above; one in which one portal merges with an advertiser while the other portal and the other producers continue as independent firms; and one in which both portals merge with advertisers. In the following two subsections, we analyze the latter two subgames. Thereafter, we return to stage 0 to determine the equilibrium outcome of this three-stage game.
One Vertical Merger (1VM)
Suppose that portal 1 and advertiser 1 have merged and maximize their aggregate profit, while portal 2 and the remaining m ≡ (n − 1) advertisers are independent firms.
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Let A 1m denote the aggregate demand for advertising space from the m independent advertisers on portal 1, and let A 11 and A 21 denote advertiser 1's (i.e., the merged firm's) advertising level on portal 1 and 2, respectively. We can then write the profit level of the merged firm aŝ
The first term in (16) is the profit from selling banners to the independent advertisers, the second and third terms downstream profits, and the fourth term the cost of advertising on the independent portal. The profits of the independent portal and advertisers are still given by equations (3) and (4), respectively. As shown above, the gains from advertising will in general be split between each portal and its advertisers. Thus, it can easily be verified that the merged firm has no incentives to give the independent advertisers access to portal 1, so that A 1m = 0. At stage 2, therefore, the merged firm solves (A 11 , A 21 ) = arg maxˆΠ 1 , while each independent advertiser k solves A 2k = arg max π 2k (k = 1, .., m) . From this, we find that the advertising level on the merged firm's own portal equals
while for the independent portal we have
From equation (17), we see that the advertising level on the merged firm's own portal is A 1 = 1/2 if b = 0. This is identical to industry optimum (cf. (6)). We further see that ∂A 1 /∂b < 0. This is because competition between the portals induces a lower advertising level the higher is b, as was the case with vertical separation.
However, the vertical merger has implications for the demand for advertising on the independent portal. The reason is that the portal that has merged gets access to a new instrument -the ability to influence directly the advertising level on the competing portal. Since the consumers perceive advertising as a nuisance it is obviously in the interest of each portal that the competitor has a large amount of advertising. On the margin, therefore, the merged firm has a higher willingness to pay for advertising on the competing portal than has each of the independent advertisers; from equation (18) we see that A 21 > A 2k for b > 0.
Interestingly, equation (18) indicates that the Bertrand paradox is solved when a vertical merger has occurred: Even though A 2k → 0 in the limit as b → 1, the same is not true for A 21 and A 1 = A 11 . This suggests that both the independent portal and the merged firm make positive profits for all values of b. Contrary to what we find in more traditional markets, this also suggests that vertical integration may increase total industry profit even if there is perfect competition between the downstream firms (advertisers) for the upstream good (banners on the portals). To check this conjecture, we will in the rest of the paper make the following assumption: Assumption 1. There is an infinite number of independent advertisers: m = ∞.
Solving for stage 1, we find (with superscript 1V M to indicate equilibrium values with one vertical merger)
which are positive even in the limit as b → 1. 16 Note also that A 1 > A 2 for b ∈ (0, 1) . Thus, the advertising volume is, in general, higher on the merged portal than on the independent portal. Comparing with equation (9), we also see that each portal has a higher advertising volume in the present case than under vertical separation when b > 0.
LetΠ
denote the profit level of the merged firm. Inserting for the equilibrium advertising levels from equation (19) in the expressions for profits, we find that the profits of the merged firm and the independent portal are always positive and equal tô
Inspection of the expressions in (20) reveals that Π
The independent portal earns a higher profit than the merged firm, because of the latter's high willingness to pay for advertising on portal 2.
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To sum up, we have the following result: c) The merged firm makes a lower profit than the independent portal.
Although the last part of the Lemma shows that the independent portal is better off than the integrated portal, this does not mean that the portals have no incentives to merge with advertisers. We come back to this question in Section 4.3 below. 16 Results for arbitrary values of m are given in the Appendix. 17 The merged firm makes a higher profit than the independent portal for sufficiently low values of b if m < ∞. The reason for this is that a smaller number of independent firms lowers the advertising level on the independent portal. If m = 2, for instance, we find that the merged firm makes a higher profit than the independent portal if b < 0.58. See Appendix.
Two Ve r t i c a l Mergers (2VM)
The next and final market structure to consider is one where portal 1 has merged with advertiser 1 and portal 2 has merged with advertiser 2. The profit of each merged firm iŝ
where A im , as above, is the aggregate demand from the independent advertisers, numbered from 3 through infinity. Maintaining the same timing structure as above, we find that, also in this case, we have A im = 0, i = 1, 2, so that independent advertisers are, in effect, foreclosed from the market. The advertising levels are now
on the merged firms' own portals, and
on the rival portals. In the asymmetric case considered above, we saw that the merged firm advertises on the competing portal. The same mechanism is present also in this case: In order to reduce the negative consequences of competition, each firm has an incentive to advertise on the rival portal. We should thus expect that advertising on each portal is higher with two vertical mergers than with just one merger or vertical separation. Formally, this is proved by using (22) and (23) and solving for stage 1 with two vertical mergers. We find:
which, for b > 0, is higher than the advertising levels in the two other cases we have considered (cf. (9) and (19)).
Using (24), we find that the profits of the merged firms equal
We have: 
The incentives to merge
In the previous subsections, we investigated different vertical structures. Using equations (14) and (25), we find the difference between aggregate industry profit as a function of b when we have two vertical mergers (Π 2V M ) and when there is no vertical merger (Π N M ):
This equation implies that total industry profit is higher with two mergers than with no merger if b > 0, and that the difference is increasing in b. The reason is that mergers lead to more advertising, particularly for high values of b.
Although the industry as a whole benefits from vertical mergers, this is not necessarily the equilibrium vertical structure. The question is whether the portals have incentives to integrate vertically at stage 0. We focus on the case of equilibria in pure strategies.
18 Stages 1 and 2 are as before. In the Appendix, we prove the following: We see that there is no conflict between individual rational merging choices and the vertical structure that maximizes industry profits if the portals are sufficiently differentiated. However, this is no longer true when the portals are close substitutes. Then, the firms find it individually rational not to form a second merged entity. Note that this is the situation where the industry as a whole has most to gain from having two vertical mergers.
The intuition for our result is closely related to the intuition we gave earlier for how the degree of portal differentiation affects the firms' profits. By the first vertical merger, total advertising in the industry increases, which is good for both portals. By the second merger, total advertising increases further. However, when the portals are close substitutes, the second merger will not take place. Instead, the independent portal prefers to free ride on the increased demand for advertising from the merged firm.
Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have presented a model of media competition when consumers dislike advertising. The model complements previous work in the literature on media economics, and has the merit of being both simple and based on first principles (i.e., consumer preferences). The model has the robust prediction that advertising prices are higher and advertising quantities and media-firm profits lower, the closer substitutes the media channels are in the eyes of the consumers.
We have used a quadratic utility function to describe the preferences of the consumers. An alternative would be to use a Hotelling framework, which would allow us to endogenize the extent of horizontal differentiation. However, a disadvantage of using a Hotelling framework is that the total size of the market is given. Indeed, by invoking the usual Hotelling assumption of market coverage, the size of the audience (total output) would by definition be independent of how strong competition is -total output would be the same whether we have monopoly or perfect competition. The Hotelling framework further presupposes unit demand, so that each consumer visits (at most) one portal. In contrast, with our formulation, we are able to analyze competition where each consumer prefers to visit both portals (multihoming) if the consumers perceive them to be horizontally differentiated.
In order to highlight the forces behind the competition between media firms, we have made a number of simplifications. We have, for instance, abstracted from competition between the advertisers/producers in the end-user market. Such competition would clearly be an argument for vertical integration between a portal and an advertiser. In analyzing the incentives for vertical integration, we further assumed that there is an infinitely large number of advertisers. In particular, this means that the advertisers take banner prices as given and that there does not exist any double-marginalization problem. Nonetheless, we found that aggregate industry profit is highest if the media firms integrate vertically. This result is in sharp contrast to what we typically find in more traditional markets, where total industry profit is independent of the vertical market structure if downstream firms are price takers with respect to the upstream good.
The only instrument available for the portals to increase their attractiveness towards the audience in our model is to reduce the level of advertising. This is clearly unrealistic. Most importantly, both portals and other media firms can invest in content and other features that make them more attractive to the public. The incentives of making such quality investments are analyzed in Kind, et al. (2004) . The main result there is that more intense competition (a larger value of b in our setting) both reduces advertising and forces the media firms to make higher quality investments. It would clearly be interesting to endogenize the quality levels of the portals also in the present context, but we believe that such an extension would not qualitatively change the incentives for vertical integration.
